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Abstract:  This paper presents a generalized method for management decision making 
incorporating risk assessment techniques. The risk based decision making methodology is 
applied to European Union expenditure programs used to implement its regional policy, such 
as the community support framework, community initiatives, special initiatives and other 
European policies. An example is presented for the development of an audit (inspection) 
program in the region of West Macedonia, Greece, during the implementation of the 3
rd 
Community Structural Support Framework Operational Program. The generic nature of the 
method permits its use in the management of similar European regional programs in Greece 
and other European countries. It is also applicable to many other industries interested in 
applying risk–based management decisions to physical or process based systems.   
Keywords:  Risk management, risk assessment, risk-based inspection, risk-based decisions, 
European operational programs, Community Support Framework. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Risk assessment techniques and risk based methods have been used in some 
form in various industries for many years. However, methods which use formalized 
techniques to make decisions based on qualitative or quantitative risk calculations are 
fairly new. In 1988 the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) in 
cooperation with private industry and government agencies formed a multi-discipline 
Research Task Force on Risk-Based Inspection. Its scope was to develop inspection 
programs of mechanical systems for industrial applications based on risk assessment 
techniques. The main objective of this effort was to develop and test new technologies to 
replace traditional inspection program development methods used by code and standards 
organizations. This effort resulted in the development of a generalized risk-based 
inspection program development methodology [[4]]. A number of subsequent 
publications applied this methodology to the development of inspection programs in the 
fossil fuel, nuclear, petroleum, chemical and other industries [[5], [6], [7]]. This 
technology has been adopted by ASME and other standard bodies in the development of 
risk based inspection standards, such as the Nuclear Code Cases N-577 and N-578 of the 
ASME Section XI Nuclear Inspection Code which contain risk based inspection 
requirement of piping systems [[8], [9]], the API 579 Recommended Practice for Fitness 
for Service [[1]] , the API RP 580 Recommended Practice of Risk Based Inspection [[2]] 
and the API RP 581 Base Resource Document [ [3]]. Since 1995, ASME has formed a 
Post Construction Committee and numerous subcommittees and groups with the task to 
develop risk based standards of mechanical systems in all industries. 
In 2002 the European Union requested the Management Authorities of European 
countries to incorporate risk methods in the management of European funded regional 
operational programs [[12], [13]]. The objective of this paper is to address this recent 
European request by adopting and expanding the ASME risk-based inspection 
development methodology to a comprehensive decision methodology applicable to the 
management of European regional programs. 
2. DEFINITION OF RISK ASSOCIATED TERMS 
2.1. Public and common uses of the term risk 
The term risk in the public has many different uses that are sometimes confusing 
and often lead to misconceptions when communicating risk in technical terms to decision 
makers. Risk as commonly used refers to undesirable events or outcomes which can 
cause harm (safety, injury or death) to the public, environment or financial losses. It is 
interchangeably used and related to terms like hazard, frequency (likelihood or 
probability), consequence (severity or magnitude of loss). Often uncertainty or lack of 
knowledge of a desirable or undesirable event is referred to as a risk. In financial 
industries, such as stock or bond markets, risk is used to describe the uncertainty of the 
expected return on investment, which sometimes can lead to losses in the original 
investment. In the insurance industry risk refers to the customer or the insurance policy. 
In the area of health and safety causes or other risk-related factors are often referred to as 
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accidents, work safety conditions etc. Often risk factors are associated only with 
frequency or consequence and do not incorporate both effects.  
Risk originates from the Latin term “resicum”, which means the challenge 
presented by a barrier reef to a sailor [[11]]. The Oxford Dictionary defines risk as a 
chance of hazard, bad consequence, loss, etc., or risk can be defined as the chance of a 
negative outcome. It can be seen that in the Oxford Dictionary definition risk is 
associated only with the chance (probability) and is not associated with the magnitude of 
the consequence, which is the second part of risk.  
In summary, all of the previous risk terms are used interchangeably in the public 
without any exact definition of their meaning. Confusion exists on the use of terms like 
risk, hazard, event, causes and other factors, which need to be differentiated in a technical 
risk-based decision making process. Therefore, there is a need for clear technical 
definitions of risk and other risk related terms, such as hazard, risk factors, risk analysis, 
risk system, etc. 
2.2. Hazard 
In the definition of risk the term hazard is almost always incorporated. 
Therefore, it is helpful to examine this term is details. Common dictionaries define 
hazard as: 1) risk, peril, jeopardy, 2) a source of danger, 3) a. chance, b. a chance event, 
accident,   4) mistake,  5) something risked. 
Roland and Moriarty [[19]] state that a safety person sees hazard as an implied 
threat or danger, or possible harm. It is a potential condition waiting to become a loss. A 
stimulus is required to make the hazard transfer from the potential state to the loss. The 
stimulus could be a component failure, a condition of the system such as pressure, 
temperature, switching condition that is out of tolerance, a maintenance failure, an 
operator failure, or a combination of multiple events and conditions.   
The technical definition of hazard given by Roland and Moriarty [[19]] is a 
potential condition, or set of conditions, either internal and/or external to a system, 
product, facility, or operation, which, when activated transforms the hazard into a series 
of events that culminate in a loss (an accident). A simpler and more fundamental 
definition of hazard is a condition that can cause injury or death, damage to loss of 
equipment or property, or environmental harm. 
ASME [[4]] defines hazard as a physical condition or a release of a hazardous 
material that could result from component failure and result in human injury or death, 
loss or damage, or environmental degradation. Hazard is the source of harm. Components 
used to transport, store, or process a hazardous material can be a source of a hazard. 
Human error and external events may also create a hazard. 
Ayyub [[11]] defines hazard as an act or phenomenon posing potential harm to 
some person or thing (i.e., is a source of harm) and its potential consequences. In order 
that hazard causes harm, it must interact with persons or things in a harmful manner. The 
magnitude of the hazard is the amount of harm that might result, including the 
seriousness and exposure levels of people and the environment. Potential hazards must be 
identified and considered during lifecycle analyses of projects in regard to the threats 
they pose that could lead to project failures. The interaction between a person (or a 
system) and a hazard can be voluntary or involuntary. E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  78
2.3. Risk analysis 
Modarres [[17]] and Modarres et al. [[18]] provide an excellent presentation of 
what a risk analysis, risk perception and risk acceptability are. The following is liberal 
summary of that presentation. 
Risk analysis is a technique for identifying, characterizing, and evaluating 
hazards. It consists of two distinct phases: a qualitative step of identifying, characterizing 
and ranking hazards; and a quantitative step of risk evaluation, which includes estimating 
the likelihood (e.g. frequencies) and consequence hazard occurrence. After risk has been 
quantified, appropriate risk-management options can be derived and considered; risk-
benefit and cost-benefit analysis may be performed; and risk-management policies may 
be formulated and implemented. The main goals of risk management are: to minimize the 
occurrence of accidents by reducing the likelihood of their occurrence (e.g., minimize 
hazard occurrence), to reduce the impacts of uncontrollable accidents (e.g., prepare and 
adopt emergency responses), and to transfer risk (e.g., via insurance coverage). The 
estimation of likelihood or frequency of hazard occurrence depends greatly on the 
reliability of the system components, the system as a whole, and human-system 
interactions.  
2.4. Technical aspects of risk 
The American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Research Task Force 
on Risk-Based Inspection defined risk as a measure of the potential for harm or loss (i.e. 
hazard) that reflects the likelihood (frequency) and severity of an adverse effect to health, 
property, or environment [[4]].  
Ayyub [[11]] formally defines risk as the potential of losses and rewards, 
resulting from an exposure to a hazard or as a result of a risk event. Unfortunately this 
definition of the term incorporates the word risk itself (i.e. risk event). Ayyub farther 
states that risk results from an event or sequence of events referred to as a scenario. The 
event or scenario can be viewed as a cause which results in consequences with various 
severities. Risk can be viewed to be a multidimensional quantity that includes event 
occurrence probability, event occurrence consequence, consequence significance, and the 
population at risk; however, it is commonly measured as the probability of occurrence of 
an event plus the outcomes or consequences associated with occurrence of the event.  
2.5. Risk in the present study 
In this study risk is defined as a measure or quantification (qualitative or 
quantitative) of the potential for harm, loss or negative change of a condition (state) in a 
physical or procedural system that combines the likelihood (e.g. frequency, probability) 
and severity (consequence) of an event or scenario with an adverse effect to the health, 
environment or property (finances) due to a hazard or procedural failure. It is the 
expected loss or harm due to inherent hazards.   
Hazard is a potential condition, or set of conditions, either internal and/or 
external to a system of products, equipment, facilities, people and procedures which, 
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financial loss or harm (such as injury or death), damage, loss of equipment or property, or 
environmental harm. A stimulus is required to cause the hazard to transform from the 
potential state in the system to a loss or harm. 
The above definition differentiates the terms risk and hazard. It characterizes 
risk as the combination and quantification of both frequency and consequence of 
undesirable events. It covers both physical and procedural systems.  
The differences and the relationship of the key risk associated terms are 
illustrated in Figure 1. In this figure there is a clear distinction between the terms hazard 
and risk. Risk involves quantification of frequencies and consequences of anticipated 
events due to an inherent hazard or condition in a system. Hazard is a physical condition 
or a cause that can be transformed by a stimulus into an undesirable event. Hazard and 
hazard analysis typically involve systems and events which have consequences that affect 
the safety of people or damage to the environment. For other types of consequences (i.e. 
financial or other measures) hazard is not used but the words “inherent condition” are 
more appropriate than the term hazard. Typical hazard analysis or hazard mitigation or 
safety analysis do not necessarily involve full quantification or assessment of risk. 
 
Hazard or 
inherent 
condition 
(activated by 
stimulus) 
Failure events 
(scenarios) 
Quantification 
of frequency 
and 
consequence 
Risk 
Quantific
ation 
 
System 
 
Figure 1: Relationship of system, hazard, failure events and risk 
 
3. MATHEMATICAL BACKGROUND OF RISK 
3.1. Notation 
The following notation is used in subsequent sections of this paper. 
C =  consequence 
F =  frequency 
R =  risk 
i  =  individual subsystem identification number (index)  
j  =  single failure event identification number (index) 
k  =  combined system or subsystem identification number (index) 
l   =  combined failure event identification number (index) 
I = cost  (investment) 
m =  decision identification number (index) 
 
3.2. Definition of risk 
Mathematically, in the case when risk is described in qualitative terms using 
solely verbal descriptions, risk can be expressed as a combination of likelihood and 
severity 
R = f (likelihood, severity) (1) E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  80
In the case where quantification is made 
Risk = Frequency x Consequence     
R FC ≡⋅ (2) 
It is noted that variables F and C are functions of other factors such as hazards, 
conditions, system properties etc. Thus, risk is a function of these factors, too. The terms 
likelihood, frequency and probability are used interchangeably and their use depends on 
the level of accuracy of quantification. The term likelihood is normally used when verbal 
descriptions (e.g. unlikely, likely, low, medium and high) are used to describe the rate of 
the occurrence of an event. Frequency is typically used when the point estimates (average 
quantities) based on available data can be made. Probability is used when mathematical 
probabilistic distributions can be fitted from available data. Similarly, the terms 
consequence and severity are used interchangeably, but here there is no implication 
regarding the accuracy of quantification. 
The above mathematical formulation can be applied to either qualitative and 
quantitative risk analysis or a mixture of both. The level of quantification effort depends 
on the nature of the decisions to be made and the availability of the required input data. 
4. DEFINITION OF A SYSTEM FOR RISK ANALYSIS 
The first step in the risk based decision making process involves the definition 
of the system and success criteria. Therefore it is appropriate to define the term “system” 
and other related terms. 
Formal definition of the word system is provided by Roland and Mortiarty 
[[19]]. System is a group of interacting, interrelated, or interdependent elements forming 
or regarded or as to be forming a collective unity. A more direct definition of a system is 
a composite of people, procedures, and equipment that are integrated to perform a 
specific operational task or a function within a specific environment. A subsystem 
represents a part of the system that may constitute a system in itself. 
The above definition is judged to be appropriate for this study since it 
encompasses people and procedures which play a significant role in the risk management 
of the implementation of the European operational programs in Greece. The development 
of the mathematical model of the system is based on the philosophy of the ISO 
9001:2000 Quality Management Systems [[16]] which is organized around the concept of 
a process. A process is an activity or set of activities, that use resources to transform 
inputs to outputs.  
On physical systems the hierarchy is typically defined with a tree like structure 
of subsystems, assemblies, subassemblies, components, elements, items etc. Different 
words are used to describe system subdivisions with increasing level of detail and 
subdivision of the physical space. The number of these subdivisions in the hierarchy 
structure varies with the type of the system and its complexity.  
On process-based systems the hierarchy is similar to the physical systems, 
except that level and sublevel numbers or other descriptive terms of the system 
subdivisions are employed. A summary of the physical and process system subdivision 
terms is presented in Table 1. E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  81
 
Table 1: Hierarchy of system subdivisions 
System 
subdivision or 
sublevel number 
Physical and 
procedural 
system 
Physical systems  Procedural systems 
(European operational 
programs) 
Number of 
subdivision in 
example case 
0 Total  system, 
Level 0 
Total system  Total of  European 
programs 
1 
1  System level 1  Subsystem  Fund  24 
2  System level 2  Assemblies  Priority    7 
3  System level 3  Subassemblies  Sub-priority   36 
4  System level 4  Components  Category of action   108 
5  System level 5  Elements  Action (project)  289 
6  System level 6  Items  Sub-action (Sub-project)  696 
…… ………  Other  descriptive 
system terms 
Work management 
process 
6721 
n System  level  n  Failure modes, risk 
parameters, etc  
Failure modes, risk 
parameters, etc 
> 100,000 
 
A system requires input in the operational state to create output. This is 
illustrated in Figure 2. The components, elements or items of the system are connected in 
such a manner that they perform a specific function when input is provided from a 
source, such as another component or a human operator. Thus, an action on a component 
will create output. This series of interconnected events cause a sequential, logical action 
in the system as it is designed. For a system to create an undesirable output a stimulus 
(external or internal to the system) is required to transform a hazard or a condition from a 
potential state to a risk loss which is called a consequence associated with harm or loss. 
Input
System or 
process in 
operation state 
Output 
 
Figure 2: System state 
Typically, to assess the impact of the decision on the system or the failure event, 
the level of the detail of the system or the procedure has to be refined to at least one more 
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5. RISK CALCULATION FOR A SYSTEM 
The mathematical formulation for the calculation of the risk in a system starts 
from the mathematical definition of risk, i.e. 
R FC ≡⋅ (3) 
The above expression can be used for both qualitative and quantitative analysis.  
For a subsystem the total risk and the risk of individual system components is 
represented as follows: 
ij j
j
R FC ≡⋅ ∑  (4)   
where,  i = subsystem index  and j = failure event index. 
The total risk of the system is given by: 
,,
,
ij ij
ij
R FC ≡⋅ ∑  (5) 
It is noted that frequencies and consequences are always a pair and are 
associated with a specific failure event. The calculation of frequencies (F) and 
consequences (C) is made using well known methods from statistics and probability 
theory. 
For systems and failure events that are not independent in probability or 
consequence terms, such as for the systems with redundancies or in the situations 
combined failure events, which often have very severe or catastrophic consequences, 
techniques such as fault tree, event tree etc are used. These techniques are capable of 
providing values of probabilities and consequences of combined events. In such cases it 
is convenient to separate independent and combined failure events, and express risk as 
,, ,,
,,
ij ij kl kl
ij kl
R FC FC ≡⋅ +⋅ ∑∑    (6) 
where,  
i  = individual subsystem identification index,  
j = individual single event index,  
k = combined subsystem identification index, and  
l = combined failure event identification index 
 
The subscripts i and k are identification indices associated with individual 
systems and combined systems, respectively. They are assigned by the model developers 
during the model development and failure mode assessment stages. In relation to the 
hierarchy process based system of the European operation program model depicted in 
Table 1, index i is associated with individual action (projects) or sub-actions (sub-
projects). Each of these actions can have one or more separate failure modes. Single 
failure modes are associated with separate management processes. In contrast indices k 
and l are associated with combined system and combined failure events, respectively. A 
failure event can involve a multitude of management processes and a number of separate 
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consequences. As a typical example, if a problem is discovered during the bid procedure 
of a construction project after the contract has been awarded, and construction has been 
initiated or even completed, this can affect additional projects apart from the one where 
the problem was discovered. If the failure is characterized as systemic (or systematic), a 
combined consequence could be the removal of all similar projects from the operational 
program because of penalties imposed by the Greek government and European Union 
procedures. The differentiation of single failure mode and combined failure modes is 
used in the present paper to track and assess such combined low frequency - high 
consequence extreme events separately. 
It is noted that combined events are sometimes very important since they are 
associated with very low frequencies or probabilities of occurrence but can have very 
high or catastrophic consequences. Obviously, they can impact the calculated risk and the 
decisions to be made for risk mitigation or risk reduction. In this situation also, the 
concept of risk perception or the acceptance criteria for risk become very important. 
Examples are business interruption and upper limits on insurance policies. Similar 
examples involve large numbers of injuries, deaths or large financial losses due events of 
nature (earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves and other extreme events), 
nuclear or chemical plant accidents, oil spills with catastrophic impact on the population 
and the environment, penalties on operational programs by the Greek government and 
European Union, etc.    
The determination of the frequency and consequence quantities employed in the 
above mathematical risk computations can cover the spectrum of qualitative, semi-
quantitative to fully-quantitative techniques. In qualitative type analyses, expert opinion 
and relative rankings are typically employed due to lack of available data. Approaches 
such as relative ranking, the weight-factor approach, the Analytical Hierarchy Process 
and other format expert solicitation approaches are typically used [[10],[11],[20]]. In 
semi-quantitative analyses point estimates of frequencies and consequences are normally 
used based on available actual data. When the data are not sufficient, these are 
supplemented with expert solicitation data. In fully quantitative analysis probabilistic 
mathematical representations of frequencies and consequences are employed. 
Quantitative analyses require both sufficient and good quality data. Often complete 
mathematical closed form solutions are difficult to develop for large and complex 
systems. In this case techniques such as Monte Carlo simulations are used in fully 
quantitative approaches. 
The rigorousness of the mathematical computations increases progressively 
from qualitative to semi-quantitative or fully-quantitative techniques. However, this does 
not necessarily imply improvements in the accuracy of the risk analysis results, since the 
quality of the results depends on the quality of the input data. Often, due to lack of 
appropriate and good quality input data, input data developed by expert solicitation 
methods produce more accurate risk output results than those obtained from more 
rigorous quantitative risk analyses employing less accurate input data.  
6. COST OF A DECISION AND RISK CHANGE IN A SYSTEM  
For decision making, it is useful to visualize the system in an existent state of 
operation. The system can be an existing system or a new system to be created in the E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  84
future but the analysis is being made from a postulated state or condition. This applies to 
both physical systems and procedural   systems (e.g. management systems). 
For the case with an existent or postulated state of the system the change of the 
risk due to a mathematical decision action, it is expressed as 
mm mm m R FCF C F C Δ≡ Δ⋅ + ⋅ Δ+ Δ⋅ Δ   (7) 
where, 
Δ = differential symbol representing change 
m = decision identification number 
 
Decisions related to risk reduction and risk mitigation could involve significant 
changes to either frequency or consequence or both. 
The new total risk after the decision is implemented is 
) ( ) ( m m m m C C F F R R R Δ + ⋅ Δ + = Δ + ≡    (8) 
Decision options require investment (cost) for the implementation of the 
decision. Thus optimized decisions that incorporate cost or investment quantities can be 
made using rankings based on the following risk to investment ratios: 
,
mm
mm
R R
I I
Δ
 (9) 
where Im = investment or cost of implementing the decision m. 
The risk measures and risk to cost ratio information can be communicated to 
decision makers using standard tabular and graphical representation methods.   
7. GENERALIZED RISK-BASED DECISION MAKING 
METHODOLOGY 
Risk based decision making involves the computation of risk, risk ranking of 
systems, subsystems, failure events, and the impact of possible desirable decisions on the 
risk (risk reduction or risk mitigation). Also, a very important facet is the appropriate 
method of communication and explanation of the computed risk information to decision 
makers, policy makers, regulators and the public. Decisions to be made are always 
associated with costs in addition to other criteria associated with business objectives, 
safety concerns, environmental issues, regulatory policies, public concerns etc. Thus, 
optimization techniques can involve multi-dimensional criteria. 
A generalized risk-based decision making methodology has been developed in 
this study utilizing the above risk concepts.  This is illustrated in detail in Figure 3 . 
 E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  85
 
Calculate Specific Consequences
15
Calculate Specific Probabilities 
13  Quantitative Analysis for 
Complex Systems and Failure 
Modes
14
Calculate Overall Risk
Rank Systems
16
Statistical Testing of Model, Sensitivity, Adjustment of Modifying Factors
17
Evaluate Decision Options
*Evaluate Change on Probability and Consequences
* Evaluate Cost/Benefits of Risk Reduction Recommendations
* Optimize Decisions under Constraints
19 Constraints ( 
Safety,Regulat 
ory,  
Economic) 
20 
Business 
Model
18
Define Model Expectations & Boundaries
1
Identify Functions and System & Component/Subsysem Boundaries
2
Conduct System Assessment
(Design, Construction, Operational Data, Inspections, Walkdowns, 
Interviews and Practices)
3
Identify Failure Events and Causes
4
Assign Preliminary Failure Probabilities and Consequences
5
Perform Initial Qualitative Risk Rankings
6
Establish Baseline Consequences
9
Establish Baseline Probabilities 
8 
Identify & Introduce Modifying Factors
10 
Identify & Introduce Modifying Factors
12
Probability and 
Consequence Data
(Public, Site Specific
Expert Opinion
11
 Risk Based Methodology  
7
Select Risk Significant Systems and Components 
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The risk-based methodology involves the following major steps where the 
corresponding steps in the flow chart are also indicated for convenience: 
i.  Definition of the system, boundaries, and success criteria (block  1) 
ii.  Identify functional characteristics of systems and sub-systems (block 2) 
iii.  Condition assessment of existing system (existing system or new system in 
hypothetical state) (block 3) 
iv.  Identification of hazards, conditions, failure events and failure causes 
(block 4) 
v.  Initial qualitative assessment of event failure frequencies and consequences 
(block 5) 
vi.  Qualitative risk calculation, risk ranking and prioritizing of systems and 
failure events (block 6) 
vii.  Selection of significant systems and failure events based on risk 
significance including assessment in uncertainties in the risk calculation 
(block 7) 
viii. Quantitative risk analysis and risk ranking of selected systems and failure 
events (blocks 8-17) 
ix.  Development of decision strategies and individual decision plans (Part of 
block 19)) 
x.  Assessment of decision strategies on the changes to risk and associated 
frequency and consequence   (blocks 18 and 19) 
xi.  Selection of decision strategies based on impact on risk changes using any 
constraints or business criteria. (blocks 19 and 20) 
In summary, basic elements of the decision making process involve the 
development of the model that represents the system, the identification of the failure 
events, the determination of frequency and consequence for each failure event, the risk 
computations, risk ranking, the development of decision strategies that might be 
implemented, the ranking and prioritization of the decision strategies based on their 
impact on the risk changes. The above basic elements apply to all types of analytical 
approaches, e.g. qualitative, semi-quantitative and fully-quantitative. 
8. RISK MANAGEMENT IN EUROPEAN UNION REGIONAL 
PROGRAMS 
The risk based decision making methodology has been applied to the 
management of European regional operational programs in the Region of West 
Macedonia, Greece. The mathematical model and associated application which was 
developed in this study is general in nature and can be applied to all other European 
operational programs in Greece and in other countries.  
 
8.1. Hierarchy of system definition 
The hierarchy of the system definition follows the general structure of the 
operational programs in Greece and is organized around the hierarchical process level 
concept. The breakdowns and the level descriptions are specified by the user and depend 
on the structure of the specific operational program. The hierarchical structure of the 
operational program in West Macedonia Greece is presented in Table 1. E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  87
The Operational Program in Greece for the 2000-2006 period is organized 
around eleven (11) Greek sector operational programs (managed  by national government 
ministries) and thirteen (13) regional operational programs (managed by the national 
government regional administrations).  
The basic funding of each operational program is summarized in Table 2 and 
illustrated in Figure 4. It is observed that major budget allocations of the sectoral 
operational programs are associated with transportation infrastructure projects (roads, 
ports, railroads and airports), followed by business competitiveness, information 
technology, education and employment. It is also pointed out that these areas have even 
larger budgets since the regional operational programs also contain budget allocations in 
these areas. 
 
Table 2: Budget allocations in operational programs in Greece 
Greek 2000-2006 Budget Allocation 
Operational Program  Budget ( € )  Percent 
Roads & Ports  9.317.357.641,00  22,20% 
Bussiness competition  6.392.333.213,00  15,23% 
Agriculture 3.010.155.273,00  7,17% 
Railroads & Airports  2.937.600.380,00  7,00% 
Information Society  2.839.078.394,00  6,76% 
Education 2.484.599.225,00  5,92% 
Employment 1.998.895.185,00  4,76% 
RG Attiki  1.542.869.230,00  3,68% 
RG Central Macedonia  1.458.922.675,00  3,48% 
RG W. Macedonia & Thrace  1.115.648.907,00  2,66% 
RG Thessalia  928.839.893,00  2,21% 
RG Central Greece  873.110.228,00  2,08% 
RG Western Greece  781.436.566,00  1,86% 
RG Crete  730.310.263,00  1,74% 
RG Pelopponisos  698.690.896,00  1,66% 
RG Ipirus  680.013.237,00  1,62% 
RG South Aegean  609.510.460,00  1,45% 
Culture 604.900.000,00  1,44% 
RG West Macedonia  580.514.032,00  1,38% 
RG North Aegean  547.904.763,00  1,31% 
Health 513.306.663,00  1,22% 
Fisheries 499.292.920,00  1,19% 
Environment 449.200.000,00  1,07% 
RG Ionian Islands  375.146.562,00  0,89% 
TOTAL 41.969.636.606,00  100,00% 
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Budgets of Operational Programs in Greece
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Figure 4: Funding of operational programs in Greece 
The budget breakdown of the Greek West Macedonian program is summarized 
in Table 3 and illustrated in Figure 5. The major budget priorities are associated with 
transportation, agriculture and rural development. These are the areas where the region of 
West Macedonia in Greece needs the most improvement due to its infrastructure, 
economic and geographic characteristics. 
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Figure 5: Budget of Operational Program of the Region of West Macedonia, Greece 
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Table 3: Budgets of major priorities in operational program in West Macedonia, Greece 
Budget Allocation in Operational Program of West Macedonia, Greece 
Major Priority 
number  Major Priority Description  Budget ( € )  Percent ( % ) 
1 Employment  24.705.396  4,26% 
2 Transportation  163.903.155  28,23% 
3 Rural  development  118.822.405  20,47% 
4  Local economy reorganization  61.922.230  10,67% 
5 Agriculture  148.064.736  25,51% 
6  Mountain & lake regions  52.824.650  9,10% 
7 Technical  support  10.271.460  1,77% 
 
Total 580.514.032  100,00% 
 
The system hierarchical breakdown of the West Macedonian operational 
program follows the subdivisions presented in Table 1. It is subdivided into priorities 
(major), sub-priorities, actions (projects), sub-projects, processes, failure modes and other 
risk parameters. The major priorities with their associated budget allocation are presented 
in Table 3. The processes have been defined following the principles of the ISO 
9001:2000 quality management philosophy. The failure modes are associated with 
individual processes in the project and sub-project level. Risk parameters are utilized to 
characterize and relatively rank failure event frequencies and consequences.  
8.2. Risk calculation 
Risk calculations of the management processes of various levels of the system 
have been performed utilizing equations 1 to 9. The model development and structure has 
been described in Section 8.1 Failure events were identified for each management 
procedure and process. The events were ranked relative to each other using expert 
solicitation techniques such as those by Saaty [[20]] and Ayyub [[10]]. Relative weight 
factors were developed separately for frequency and consequence event quantities. Risk 
computations were performed using these relative weight-factors. The risk results were 
ranked and grouped in accordance with the hierarchical model structure presented in 
Table 1 (e.g. such major priorities, sub-priorities, actions, sub-actions, etc). 
The risk contribution of the major priorities and sub-priorities in the operational 
programs is presented in Figure 6 and Figure 7. It is seen that certain priorities and sub-
priorities have higher risk contribution than others. This risk contribution is not solely 
related to the priority budget but depends on the status of the implementation of the 
programs and all the risk parameters. For example, from Figure 6 and accompanying 
Table 3, it is observed that agriculture projects are the most risk significant, followed by 
rural development projects. Transportation projects, which have the largest budget E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  90
allocation in the operation program and have progressed more in the implementation 
stage, are relatively low risk projects. The reason is that significant management 
experience and technological developments have been gained in Greece during previous 
operational programs. Operational programs such as the 2
nd Programmatic Period 1994-
1999 had an emphasis on infrastructure projects such as transportation. 
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Figure 6: Risk of major priorities of operational program 
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Figure 7: Risk of sub- priorities of operational program 
A similar plot of the cumulative risk of the individual projects or action in the 
operational program is presented in  
Figure 8. It is observed that approximately 30% of the projects are associated 
with 70% of the total system risk. This information can be used to select the most risk E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  91
significant projects for applying management decision options to reduce the operational 
program risk. It is also observed that the nature of the behavior is similar to the common 
80-20 approximate rule found in many applications (Pareto effect). 
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Figure 8: Cumulative risk of projects (actions) 
The benefit of the risk analysis results in the management decision making 
process is that resources can be prioritized and directed toward the most risk significant 
projects. For example, because of budget constraints management actions can not be 
applied to all projects equally. By selecting 30% of the most risk-significant projects the 
management can address 70% of the risk. This also has an additional benefit of 
improving the effectiveness and quality of the management actions while simultaneously 
reducing the implementation costs. 
8.3. Audit (inspection) program development 
Based on the previous risk calculation and relative risk ranking an annual field 
audit (inspection) program of projects in implementation stage was developed. In the risk 
computation only management processes that are associated with field implementation 
have been used in the risk computations.   
The cumulative risk of the annual audit plan on the sub-project level is 
illustrated in Figure 9. The significance of this method is that manpower and resources 
are optimally applied to selected risk significant management process instead of the 
thousands of processes in the systems, which is often unattainable based on time, 
available budgets or other resource constraints.  The audit program is typically developed 
for planning purposes on a yearly basis because European and Greek program procedures 
dictate minimum yearly frequency and budget audit targets. However, the risk evaluation 
and audit program is a continuous process since the program implementation and the 
relative project risk contribution change continuously. Thus, the projects and sub-projects E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  92
selected at the yearly planning level can change during the year within the constraints 
discussed above. 
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Figure 9: Cumulative risk of subprojects selected for inspection (audit) plan 
The impact of the risk results on the decision making processes on the sub-
project level is similar to those observed on the project-level. Resources can be directed 
towards the most risk-significant sub-projects and associated audit (inspection) processes. 
Improvements in quality and effectiveness of the audit program are achieved while 
implementation costs of the program are reduced. 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
A generalized method for management decision making incorporating risk 
assessment techniques is presented.  The risk based decision making methodology is 
applied to European Union expenditure programs used to implement its regional policy, 
such as the community support framework, community initiatives, special initiatives and 
other European programs. An example is presented for the development of an audit 
(inspection) program in the region of West Macedonia, Greece, during the 
implementation of the 3
rd Community Structural Support Framework Operational 
Program. The generic nature of the method permits its use in the management of similar 
European regional programs in Greece and other European countries. Its is also 
applicable to many other industries interested in applying risk–based management 
decisions to physical or process based systems.   
The limitations of the results presented in this paper are associated with the 
definition and detail of  processes in the hierarchical model developed to represent an 
operational program, the postulation of the failure events, the dynamic nature and the 
implementation status of the operational program, the accuracy and sensitivity of the 
qualitative data obtained from the expert solicitation process and the selection and E. Michalopoulos, A.C. Georgiou, K. Paparrizos / Risk-Based Decision Making  93
definition of the risk parameters used to calculate the frequency and consequences of the 
system failure models.  
Future improvements can be made to utilize quantitative instead of qualitative 
frequency and consequence data, to develop risk index relationships to unify qualitative, 
semi-quantitative and fully quantitative risk analysis methods, and to include benefit 
quantities in the decision making process in addition to the risk and cost factors 
considered in this study. 
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